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Social conflict, growth and factor shares

Tsoukis, Christopher and Tournemaine, Frederic (2010): Social conflict, growth and factor shares.


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Standard growth theory is based on atomistic agents with no strategic interactions among them. In contrast, we model growth as resulting from a one-off, strategic game between workers and owners of capital (capitalists) on factor shares, in an otherwise standard AK growth model. The resulting distribution of income between factors further determines the marginal revenue product of capital and the rate of growth. We analyse the properties of four equilibria: competitive, Stackelberg equilibrium, a hybrid non-cooperative regime, and cooperative (Nash) solution. We show that our model provides a potentially richer view of the growth process than comparable models, and endogenises a key aspect of the social contract.

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