Samet, Dov (2009): What if Achilles and the tortoise were to bargain? An argument against interim agreements.

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Abstract
Zeno's paradoxes of motion, which claim that moving from one point to another cannot be accomplished in finite time, seem to be of serious concern when moving towards an agreement is concerned. Parkinson's Law of Triviality implies that such an agreement cannot be reached in finite time. By explicitly modeling dynamic processes of reaching interim agreements and using arguments similar to Zeno's, we show that if utilities are von NeumannMorgenstern, then no such process can bring about an agreement in finite time in linear bargaining problems. To extend this result for all bargaining problems, we characterize a particular path illustrated by \cite{ra}, and show that no agreement is reached along this path in finite time.
Item Type:  MPRA Paper 

Original Title:  What if Achilles and the tortoise were to bargain? An argument against interim agreements 
Language:  English 
Keywords:  Zeno's paradox, bargaining problems, interim agreements, vNM utility 
Subjects:  D  Microeconomics > D7  Analysis of Collective DecisionMaking > D73  Bureaucracy ; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations ; Corruption C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7  Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C70  General D  Microeconomics > D7  Analysis of Collective DecisionMaking > D70  General C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7  Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78  Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory D  Microeconomics > D7  Analysis of Collective DecisionMaking > D74  Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions D  Microeconomics > D7  Analysis of Collective DecisionMaking > D72  Political Processes: RentSeeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior 
Item ID:  23370 
Depositing User:  dov samet 
Date Deposited:  18. Jun 2010 22:18 
Last Modified:  27. May 2015 06:22 
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URI:  https://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/id/eprint/23370 