Bellemare, Marc F. (2010): Agricultural Extension and Imperfect Supervision in Contract Farming: Evidence from Madagascar. Forthcoming in: Agricultural Economics
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This article tests whether agricultural extension and imperfect supervision -- conflated here into the number of visits by a technical assistant -- increase productivity in a sample of contract farming arrangements between a processing �rm and small agricultural producers in Madagascar. Production functions are estimated which treat the number of visits by a technical assistant as an input and which exploit the variation in the number of visits between the contracted crops grown on a given plot by a speci�c grower, thereby accounting for district-, grower-, and plot-level unobserved heterogeneity. Results indicate that the elasticity of yield with respect to the number of visits lies between 1.3 and 1.7.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Agricultural Extension and Imperfect Supervision in Contract Farming: Evidence from Madagascar|
|Keywords:||Supervision, Extension, Contract Farming, Grower-Processor Contracts|
|Subjects:||O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O1 - Economic Development > O13 - Agriculture ; Natural Resources ; Energy ; Environment ; Other Primary Products
L - Industrial Organization > L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior > L24 - Contracting Out ; Joint Ventures ; Technology Licensing
Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q1 - Agriculture > Q12 - Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets
O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O1 - Economic Development > O14 - Industrialization ; Manufacturing and Service Industries ; Choice of Technology
|Depositing User:||Marc F Bellemare|
|Date Deposited:||11. Jul 2010 18:01|
|Last Modified:||31. Dec 2015 01:21|
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