Information transmission and the emergence of a peculiar trading facility in certain emerging markets

Siddiqi, Hammad (2010): Information transmission and the emergence of a peculiar trading facility in certain emerging markets.

Abstract

A peculiar carry over transaction facility has been associated with emerging markets of India and Pakistan. We show that the trading facility can be considered a market response to the information gaps in these markets. Information can be credibly transmitted through this trading facility. Hence, the emergence of such a trading facility is, perhaps, an example of a creative market response to information problems.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Information Asymmetry; Information Transmission; Emerging Markets; Perfect Bayesian Equilibria; Badla Finance
• Subjects: N - Economic History > N2 - Financial Markets and Institutions > N20 - General, International, or Comparative; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design; G - Financial Economics > G1 - General Financial Markets > G10 - General; D - Microeconomics > D0 - General > D00 - General

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