Breuer, Janice Boucher and McDermott, John (2009): Trustworthiness and economic performance.
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Abstract
Intrinsically trustworthy agents never cheat. A society's willingness to trust and the quality of its institutions have their origins in the intrinsic trustworthiness of its citizens. Trustworthiness is the basis for maximizing output in economic exchange and in explaining differences in standards of living around the world. We measure intrinsic trustworthiness with a question from the World Values Survey and estimate its effect using a sample of 60 countries. We find that trustworthiness is important for output per capita and that the effect of trust is likely to come from trustworthiness.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Trustworthiness and economic performance |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | trustworthiness; trust; institutions; output per capita |
Subjects: | O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O4 - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity > O43 - Institutions and Growth Z - Other Special Topics > Z1 - Cultural Economics ; Economic Sociology ; Economic Anthropology > Z13 - Economic Sociology ; Economic Anthropology ; Social and Economic Stratification |
Item ID: | 24486 |
Depositing User: | Janice Boucher Breuer |
Date Deposited: | 19 Aug 2010 00:57 |
Last Modified: | 27 Sep 2019 07:44 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/24486 |
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Trustworthiness and economic performance. (deposited 14 Aug 2009 06:05)
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