Reinhart, Carmen and Qian, Rong and Rogoff, Kenneth (2010): Do countries “graduate” from crises? Some historical perspective.
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Abstract
The widespread banking crises since 2007 among advanced economies and the “near” default of Greece in 2010 dashed the popular notion that rich countries have outgrown severe financial crises. Record or near-record declines in output accompanying these events signaled the end of the short-lived “great moderation era.” In fact, graduation from recurring sovereign external debt crises is a very tortuous process that sometimes takes a century or more. For banking crises, we simply do not know what it takes to graduate; it is unclear whether any country has managed it.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Do countries “graduate” from crises? Some historical perspective |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | financial crisis, debt, default, banking, reversals, duration |
Subjects: | E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E0 - General F - International Economics > F3 - International Finance N - Economic History > N0 - General |
Item ID: | 24761 |
Depositing User: | Carmen Reinhart |
Date Deposited: | 06 Sep 2010 13:02 |
Last Modified: | 02 Oct 2019 04:44 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/24761 |