Breitmoser, Yves (2010): Protocoalition bargaining and the core.

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Abstract
In the protocoalition model of government formation, formateur F appoints a protocoalition and asks its members whether to start negotiating a coalition contract. If all accept, then the protocoalition forms and starts negotiating; otherwise a caretaker government assumes office. I extend this model by allowing F to revise the chosen protocoalition after rejections, that he states preconditions for the subsequent negotiations, and that F's opponents may publicly precommit to accept/reject certain proposals. The set of equilibrium outcomes is identified as the core if F's opponents can precommit and as the convex hull of the core if they cannot precommit credibly. This extended model eliminates two flaws of the standard model: it explains why F cannot always install his favored coalition (whatever the status quo) and why "important" coalition members may have more bargaining power in the subsequent negotiations than others.
Item Type:  MPRA Paper 

Original Title:  Protocoalition bargaining and the core 
Language:  English 
Keywords:  coalition formation, noncooperative bargaining, core 
Subjects:  C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7  Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78  Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory D  Microeconomics > D7  Analysis of Collective DecisionMaking > D72  Political Processes: RentSeeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7  Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72  Noncooperative Games 
Item ID:  24995 
Depositing User:  Yves Breitmoser 
Date Deposited:  15. Sep 2010 01:28 
Last Modified:  01. Jan 2016 05:43 
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URI:  https://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/id/eprint/24995 