Re-evaluating the success of the EPA's 33/50 program: evidence from facility participation

Martina, Vidovic and Neha, Khanna (2010): Re-evaluating the success of the EPA's 33/50 program: evidence from facility participation.

Abstract

Using previously unavailable data, we examine facility participation in the 33/50 Program and its effect on aggregate and toxicity weighted emissions between1991 and 1995 for a sample of facilities whose parent firms committed to the Program. By focusing on individual facilities we avoid the biases created by aggregating emissions across facilities. We find that while more polluting facilities within a firm were more likely to participate, even when we account for the toxicity of emissions, across firms there is no evidence of greater participation by facilities with higher emissions. Although emissions of the 33/50 chemicals fell over the years, we find that participation in the Program did not lead to the decline in the 33/50 releases generated by these facilities.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Toxic Release Inventory; program participation; program evaluation, GMM, dynamic panel
• Subjects: Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q5 - Environmental Economics > Q53 - Air Pollution ; Water Pollution ; Noise ; Hazardous Waste ; Solid Waste ; Recycling; Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q5 - Environmental Economics > Q58 - Government Policy; L - Industrial Organization > L6 - Industry Studies: Manufacturing > L60 - General

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