Does Political Competition Matter for Economic Performance? Evidence from Sub-national Data

Saibal, Ghosh (2010): Does Political Competition Matter for Economic Performance? Evidence from Sub-national Data. Published in: Political Studies , Vol. 58, No. 5 (December 2010): pp. 1030-1048.

Abstract

The study utilizes data on major Indian states for 1980-2004 to explore the impact of political competition on state-level income and fiscal variables. The findings suggest that increase in political competition leads to an increase in state per capita income and growth. Focusing on fiscal variables, the analysis indicates that tighter political competition increases economic expenditure.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: political competition; economic performance; fiscal policy; sub-national; india
• Subjects: H - Public Economics > H7 - State and Local Government ; Intergovernmental Relations > H72 - State and Local Budget and Expenditures; H - Public Economics > H7 - State and Local Government ; Intergovernmental Relations > H71 - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue; P - Economic Systems > P5 - Comparative Economic Systems > P52 - Comparative Studies of Particular Economies

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