Ottoz, Elisabetta and Cugno, Franco (2010): Choosing the scope of trade secret law when secrets complement patents.
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We present a model where an incumbent firm has a proprietary product whose technology consists of at least two components, one of which is patented while the other is kept secret. At the patent expiration date, an entrant firm will enter the market on the same technological footing as the incumbent if it is successful in duplicating, at certain costs, the secret component of the incumbent’s technology. Otherwise, it will enter the market with a production cost disadvantage. We show that under some conditions a broad scope of trade secret law is socially beneficial despite the innovator is over-rewarded.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Choosing the scope of trade secret law when secrets complement patents|
|Keywords:||knowledge spillovers; duplication costs; covenants not to compete; inevitable disclosure|
|Subjects:||O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O3 - Innovation ; Research and Development ; Technological Change ; Intellectual Property Rights > O34 - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O3 - Innovation ; Research and Development ; Technological Change ; Intellectual Property Rights > O31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
|Depositing User:||Franco Cugno|
|Date Deposited:||05. Dec 2010 19:48|
|Last Modified:||31. Dec 2015 01:24|
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Choosing the scope of trade secret law when secrets complement patents. (deposited 16. Feb 2010 00:27)
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