Alcalde, Jose and Romero-Medina, Antonio (2011): Re-Reforming the Bostonian System: A Novel Approach to the Schooling Problem.
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This paper proposes the notion of E-stability to conciliate Pareto efficiency and fairness. We propose the use of a centralized procedure, the Exchanging Places Mechanism. It endows students a position according with the Gale and Shapley students optimal stable matching as tentative allocation and allows the student to trade their positions. We show that the final allocation is E-stable, i.e. efficient, fair and immune to any justifiable objection that students can formulate.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Re-Reforming the Bostonian System: A Novel Approach to the Schooling Problem|
|Keywords:||School allocation problem, Pareto efficient matching|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71 - Cooperative Games
|Depositing User:||Jose Alcalde|
|Date Deposited:||23. Jan 2011 13:51|
|Last Modified:||19. Feb 2013 23:36|
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