Tensión diplomática entre Colombia y Ecuador durante 2006-2009: una mirada desde la teoría de juegos.

Arroyo, Santiago and Bolaños, Juan (2010): Tensión diplomática entre Colombia y Ecuador durante 2006-2009: una mirada desde la teoría de juegos. Published in: Revista Economía, Gestión y Desarrollo , Vol. 10, No. 1657-5946 (17 December 2010): pp. 125-141.

Abstract

This paper centres his analysis on the diplomatic tension between Colombia and Ecuador during the period 2006-2009. For it, is studied from the game theory,the diplomatic tension that both countries faced, product the air fumigations that Colombia realized in the zone of border with the Ecuador an territory, as well as the assault trealized by the Colombian army to the camp of the revolutionary Armed forces of colombia (Farc), where Raúl Reyes was brought down. Of particular form, modelling a Not cooperative game of complete information, which proved an Efficient Nash Equilibrium for pure actions, where every country understands that the tension between both, it is affecting the importance of the binational agenda.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• English Title: Diplomatic tension between Colombia and Ecuador during 2006-2009: a look from the theory of games.
• Language: Spanish
• Keywords: Game Theory, diplomatic relations
• Subjects: F - International Economics > F5 - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy > F50 - General; K - Law and Economics > K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior > K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games

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