From the lab to the field: Cooperation among fishermen

Stoop, Jan and Noussair, Charles and van Soest, Daan (2010): From the lab to the field: Cooperation among fishermen.

Abstract

We conduct a field experiment to measure cooperation among groups of recreational fishermen at a privately owned fishing facility. The parameters are chosen so that group earnings are greater when group members catch fewer fish, as in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism (VCM). In a manner consistent with classical economic theory, though in contrast to prior results from laboratory experiments, we find no evidence of cooperation. We construct a series of additional treatments to identify causes of the di®erence. We rule out the subject pool and the laboratory setting as potential causes, and identify the type of activity involved as the source of the lack of cooperation in our field experiment. When cooperation requires a reduction in fishing effort, individuals are not cooperative, whether the reduction in fishing translates into more money or into more fishing opportunities for the group.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Public Goods Game, Field Experiment, Social Preferences
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C93 - Field Experiments; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games

References

Alpizar, F., Carlsson, F., and Johansson-Stenman, O. (2008). Anonymity, reciprocity, and conformity: Evidence from voluntary contributions to a national park in Costa Rica. Journal of Public Economics, 92, 1047{1060.

Andreoni, J. (1988). Why free ride? Strategies and learning in public goods experiments. Journal of Public Economics, 37, 291-304.

Andreoni, J. (1995). Cooperation in public-goods experiments: Kindness or confusion? The American Econonomic Review, 85 (4), 891{904.

Andreoni, J. and Samuelson, L. (2006). Building rational cooperation. Journal of Economic Theory, 127, 117-154.

Bandiera, O., Barankay, I., and Rasul, I. (2005). Social preferences and the response to incentives: Evidence from personnel data. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120 (3), 917-962.

Barr, A. (2001). Social dilemmas and shame-based sanctions: Experimental results from rural Zimbabwe. Working Paper.

Benz, M. and Meier, S. (2008). Do people behave in experiments as in real life? Evidence from donations. Experimental Economics, 11 (3), 268-281.

Bolton, G. E. and Ockenfels, A. (2000). Erc: A theory of equity, reciprocity, and competition. The American Economic Review, 90 (1), 166-193.

Brandts, J., Saijo, T., and Schram, A. (2004). How universal is behavior? A four country comparison of spite and cooperation in voluntary contri bution mechanisms. Public Choice, 119, 381-424.

Brandts, J. and Schram, A. (2001). Cooperation and noise in public goods experiments: applying the contribution function approach. Journal of Public Economics, 79, 399-427.

Brown, G. (2000). Renewable natural resource management and use without markets. Journal of Economic Literature, 38, 875-914.

Cardenas, J. C. (2003). Real wealth and experimental cooperation: Experiments in the field lab. Journal of Development Economics, 70, 263-289.

Cardenas, J. C. (2004). Norms from outside and from inside: An experimental analysis on the governance of local ecosystems. Forest Policy and Economics, 6, 229-241.

Cardenas, J. C. and Ostrom, E. (2004). What do people bring into the game? Experiments in the field about cooperation in the commons. Agricultural Systems, 82, 307-326.

Carpenter, J. and Seki, E. (2005). Do social preferences increase productivity? Field experimental evidence from fishermen in Toyama bay. Working Paper.

Clark, C. (1980). Restricted access to common-property fishery resources: A game-theoretic analysis, Lui, P. (ed.). Dynamic Optimization and Mathematical Economics, Plenum Press, New York, 117-132.

Croson, R. and Shang, J. Y. (2008). The impact of downward social information on contribution decisions. Experimental Economics, 11 (3), 221-233.

Dockner, E., Jorgensen, S., Long, N. V., and Sorger, G. (2000). Differentialgames in economics and management science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Erev, I., Bornstein, G., and Galili, R. (1993). Constructive intergroup competition as a solution to the free rider problem: A field experiment. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 29, 463-478.

Fehr, E. and Gaechter, S. (2000). Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments. The American Economic Review, 90 (4), 980-994.

Fehr, E. and Leibbrandt, A. (2008). Cooperativeness and impatience in the Tragedy of the Commons. Working Paper.

Fehr, E. and Schmidt, K. (1999). A theory of fairness, competition and cooperation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, 817-868.

Frey, B. S. and Meier, S. (2004). Social comparisons and pro-social behavior: Testing conditional cooperation in a field experiment. American Economic Review, 94 (5), 1717-1722.

Gaechter, S. and Fehr, E. (1999). Collective action as a social exchange. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 39, 341-369.

Gezelius, S. (2007). The social aspects of fishing effort: Technology and community in norways blue whiting ¯sheries. Human Ecology, 35, 587-599.

Gneezy, U., Haruvy, E., and Yafe, H. (2004). The inefficiency of splitting the bill. The Economic Journal, 114, 265-280.

Harrison, G. and List, J. (2004). Field experiments. Journal of Economic Literature, 42 (4), 1009-1055.

Hartl, R. and Feichtinger, G. (1987). A new sufficient condition for most rapid approach paths. Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 54 (2), 403-411.

Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., and Gintis, H. (2004). Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies. Oxford University Press, New York.

Hermann, B., Thoni, C., and Gaechter, S. (2008). Antisocial punishment across societies. Science, 319, 1362-1367.

Houser, D. and Kurzban, R. (2002). Revisiting kindness and confusion in public goods experiments. The American Economic Review, 92 (4), 1062-1069.

Isaac, R., McCue, K., and Plott, C. (1985). Public goods provision in an experimental environment. Journal of Public Economics, 26 (1), 51-74.

Isaac, R. M. and Walker, J. M. (1988a). Communication and free-riding behavior: The voluntary contribution mechanism. Economic Inquiry, 26 (4), 585-608.

Isaac, R. M. and Walker, J. M. (1988b). Group size effects in public goods provision: The voluntary contributions mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 103 (1), 179-199.

Karlan, D. S. (2005). Using experimental economics to measure social capital and predict financial decisions. The American Economic Review, 95 (5), 1688-1699.

Laury, S. K. and Taylor, L. O. (2005). Altruism spillovers: Are behaviors in context-free experiments predictive of altruism toward a naturally occurring public good? Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 65, 9-29.

Ledyard, J. (1995). Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research. Princeton University Press.

Levitt, S. D. and List, J. A. (2007). What do laboratory experiments measuring social preferences reveal about the real world? Journal of Economic Perspectives, Volume 21 (2), 153-174.

Levitt, S. D. and List, J. A. (2008). Homo economicus evolves. Science, 319 (5865), 909-910.

List, J. A. (2006). The behavioralist meets the market: Measuring social preferences and reputation effects in actual transactions. Journal of Political Economy, 114 (1), 1-37.

List, J. A. and Lucking-Reiley, D. (2002). The effects of seed money and refunds on charitable giving: Experimental evidence from a university capital campaign. Journal of Political Economy, 110 (1).

Martiny, R. and Randal, J. (2005). Voluntary contributions to a public good: A natural field experiment. Working Paper.

Masclet, D., Noussair, C., and Tucker, S.and Villeval, M. (2003). Monetary and nonmonetary punishment in the voluntary contributions mechanism. The American Economic Review, 93 (1), 366-380.

Neugebauer, T., Perote, J., Schmidt, U., and Loos, M. (2007). Selfish-biased conditional cooperation: On the decline of contributions in repeated pub- lic goods experiments. Kiel Working Papers, 1376.

Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Actions. Cambridge University Press.

Palfrey, T. and Prisbey, J. (1996). Altruism, reputation and noise in linear public goods experiments. Journal of Public Economics, 61, 409-427.

Rabin, M. (1993). Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics. the American Economic Review, 83 (5), 1281-1302.

Rodriguez-Sickert, C., Andrs Guzmn, R., and Cardenas, J. C. (2008). Institutions influence preferences: Evidence from a common pool resource experiment. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 67, 215-227.

Rufle, B. J. and Sosis, R. (2007). Does it pay to pray? Costly ritual and cooperation. The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy, 7 (1), 1-37.

Sonnemans, J., Schram, A., and Offerman, T. (1999). Strategic behavior in public good games: when partners drift apart. Economics Letters, 62, 35-41.

Toivonen, A., Roth, E., Navrud, S., Gudbergsson, G., Appelblad, H., Bengtsson, B., and Tuunainen, P. (2004). The economic value of recreational fisheries in Nordic countries. Fisheries Management and Ecology, 11, 1-14.

van Ginkel, R. (2009). Braving Troubled Waters: Sea Change in a Dutch Fishing Community. Amsterdam: Center for Maritime Research and Amsterdam University Press.