Alcalde, Jose and Subiza, Begoña (2011): On Integration Policies and Schooling.
Download (421kB) | Preview
This paper proposes a reform for school allocation procedures in order to help integration policies reach their objective. For this purpose, we suggest the use of a natural two-step mechanism. The (stable) first step is introduced as an adaptation of the deferred-acceptance algorithm designed by Gale and Shapley (1962), when students are divided into two groups. The (efficient) second step captures the idea of exchanging places inherent to Gale's Top Trading Cycle. This latter step could be useful for Municipal School Boards when implementing some integration policies.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||On Integration Policies and Schooling|
|Keywords:||Integration Policy; School Allocation; Affirmative Action|
|Subjects:||I - Health, Education, and Welfare > I2 - Education and Research Institutions > I28 - Government Policy
J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J1 - Demographic Economics > J18 - Public Policy
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games
|Depositing User:||Jose Alcalde|
|Date Deposited:||09 Mar 2011 16:01|
|Last Modified:||07 Nov 2016 12:17|
Abdulkadiroglu, A., 2005. College Admissions with Affirmative Action. International Journal of Game Theory 33, 535–549.
Abdulkadiroglu, A., Pathak, P.A., Roth, A.E., 2005. The New York City High School Match. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 95, 364–367.
Abdulkadiroglu, A., Pathak, P.A., Roth, A.E., 2009. Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match. American Economic Review 99, 1954–1978.
Abdulkadiroglu, A., Pathak, P.A., Roth, A.E., Sönmez, T., 2005. The Boston Public School Match. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 95, 368–371.
Abdulkadiroglu, A., Pathak, P.A., Roth, A.E., Sönmez, T., 2006. Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism: Strategy-Proofness as Equal Access. Mimeographed. Harvard University.
Abdulkadiroglu, A., Sönmez, T., 2003. School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach. American Economic Review 93, 729–747.
Alcalde, J., Romero-Medina, A., 2011. On Stability and Efficiency in Scool Choice Problems. SSRN WP 1760592.
Alcalde, J., Romero-Medina, A., 2011. Re-reforming the Bostonian System: A Novel Approach to the Schooling Problem. SSRN WP 1743082.
Alcalde-Unzu, J., Molis, E., 2011. Exchange of Indivisible Goods and Indifferences: The Top Trading Absorbing Sets Mechanisms. Games and Economic Behavior, forthcoming.
van Buren, P.M., 1995. A Theology of the Jewish-Christian Reality: A Christian Theology of the People Israel. University Press of America, Lanham, MD.
Curran, S.R., Shafer, S., Donato, K.M., Garip, F., 2006. Mapping Gender and Migration in Sociological Scholarship: Is It Segregation or Integration? International Migration Review 40, 199–223.
Dougherty, J., Harrelson, J., Maloney, L., Murphy, D., Smith, R., Snow, M., Zannoni, D., 2009. School Choice in Suburbia: Test Scores, Race, and Housing Markets. American Journal of Education 115, 523–548.
Ehlers, L., 2010. School Choice with Control. Mimeographed. Université de Montréal.
Ergin, H., Sönmez, T., 2006. Games of School Choice under the Boston Mechanism. Journal of Public Economics 90, 215 – 237.
Frankel, D.M., Volij, O., 2011. Measuring School Segregation. Journal of Economic Theory 146, 1–38.
Gajendragadkar, S.S., 2006. The Constitutionality of Racial Balancing in Charter Schools. Columbia Law Review 106, 144–181.
Gale, D., Shapley, L.S., 1962. College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage. American Mathematical Monthly 69, 9–15.
Garda, R.A., 2009. The White Interest in School Integration. Mimeographed. New Orleans College of Law, Loyola University.
Kane, T.J., Riegg, S.K., Staiger, D.O., 2006. School Quality, Neighborhoods and Housing Prices. American Law and Economics Review 8, 183–212.
Kesten, O., 2010. School Choice with Consent. Quarterly Journal of Economics 125, 1297–1348.
Kojima, F., 2010. School Choice: Impossibilities for Affirmative Action. Mimeographed. Stanford University.
Niederle, M., Roth, A.E., Sönmez, T., 2008. Matching and Market Design, in: Durlauf, S.N., Blume, L.E. (Eds.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.
Oliver, M., 1985. The Integration–Segregation Debate: Some Sociological Considerations. British Journal of Sociology of Education 6, 75–92.
Roth, A.E., 1982. The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives. Mathematics of Operations Research 7, 617–628.
Roth, A.E., Peranson, E., 1999. The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design. American Economic Review 89, 748–780.
Roth, A.E., Sotomayor, M.O., 1990. Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis. Cambridge University Press, New York.
Roth, A.E., Xing, X., 1994. Jumping the Gun: Imperfections and Institutions Related to the Timing of Market Transactions. American Economic Review 84, 992–1044.
Seitles, M., 1998. The Perpetuation of Residential Racial Segregation in America: Historical Discrimination, Modern Forms of Exclusion, and Inclusionary Remedies. Journal of Land Use and Environmental Law 14, 1–38.
Shapley, L.S., Scarf, H., 1974. On Cores and Indivisibility. Journal of Mathematical Economics 1, 23–37.