Defense Expenditure and Economic Growth under External Predation

Liu, Tao-Xiong and Hu, An-Gang and Zhou, Bi-Hua (2011): Defense Expenditure and Economic Growth under External Predation.

Abstract

This paper develops a growth model of a country under a Hobbesian environment with international conflicts where national defense is the only way to prevent external predation. The long run growth path is determined by the equilibrium of a dynamic game with three players, the external predator, the government and the family. The equilibrium growth path has three phases, submissive equilibrium, tolerant equilibrium and full-protected equilibrium. Different defense strategies result in different growth prospects and sustainable growth will endogenously induce adjustment of defense strategies.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: economic growth; predate; defense expenditure
• Subjects: F - International Economics > F5 - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy > F51 - International Conflicts ; Negotiations ; Sanctions; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook > E60 - General

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