Redistribution and Reelection under Proportional Representation: The Postwar Italian Chamber of Deputies

Golden, Miriam and Picci, Lucio (2011): Redistribution and Reelection under Proportional Representation: The Postwar Italian Chamber of Deputies.

Abstract

We study incumbency advantage and the electoral returns to pork and patronage over ten legislative periods from 1948 to 1992 for two political parties — the Christian Democrats (DC) and the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) — in Italy’s lower house of representatives, the Chamber of Deputies. Adapting a regression discontinuity design to Italy’s open-list system of proportional representation, we show that parliament comprised two groups: a small elite, whose members enjoyed an incumbency advantage, and the average deputy, who benefitted from no such incumbency advantage. Elite legislators affiliated with Italy’s two main parties of government received significantly more preference votes when pork and patronage were steered to their districts, although the effect is small. We interpret this to indicate that their incumbency advantage was linked to their ability to claim credit for these allocations. We also show that the two parties won more list votes when districts received more resources and that when districts received more resources, the abilities of these parties to persuade their electors to use preference votes improved. This form of electoral mobilization, in turn, enlarged the number of ministerial positions secured by the district. Our analysis depicts a political environment severely segmented between a small, powerful elite group of deputies and backbenchers.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: incumbency effect, distributive politics, patronage, proportional representation, Italy, regression discontinuity
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C1 - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General > C14 - Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods: General; H - Public Economics > H1 - Structure and Scope of Government > H11 - Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government; H - Public Economics > H4 - Publicly Provided Goods > H41 - Public Goods; H - Public Economics > H8 - Miscellaneous Issues > H83 - Public Administration ; Public Sector Accounting and Audits; H - Public Economics > H7 - State and Local Government ; Intergovernmental Relations > H76 - State and Local Government: Other Expenditure Categories

References

Ames, Barry. 1995. “Electoral Strategy under Open-List Proportional Representation.” American Journal of Political Science 39 (May): 406-33.

Bearman, Peter S. and Palo Parigi. 2008. “Spaghetti Politics: Local Electoral Systems and Alliance Structure in Italy, 1984-2001.” Social Forces 87 (Dec.): 623-49.

Beck, Thorsten, Clarke, George, Groff, Alberto, Keefer, Philip and Walsh, Patrick. 2001. “New Tools in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions.” World Bank Economic Review 15 (Jan.): 165-76.

Cain, Bruce E., Ferejohn, John A., and Fiorina, Morris P. 1984. “The Constituency Service Basis of the Personal Vote for U.S. Representatives and British Members of Parliament.” American Political Science Review 78 (March): 110-25.

Carey, John M. and Shugart, Matthew Sobert. 1995. “Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: a Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas.” Electoral Studies 14 (Dec.): 417-39. Chakrabarti, Rajesh, Gangopadhyay, Shubhashis, and Krishnan,

Shagun. N.d. “Incumbency Effects in Indian Elections — A Preliminary Exploration.” Unpublished paper.

Cotta, Maurizio. 1979. Classe politica e parlamento in Italia. Bologna: Il Mulino.

Cox, Gary W. and Morgenstern, Scott. 1995. “The Incumbency Advantage in

Multimember Districts: Evidence from the U.S. States.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 20 (Aug.): 329-49.

Crisp, Brian F. and Desposato, Scott W. 2004. “Constituency Building in Multimember Districts: Collusion or Conflict?” Journal of Politics 66 (Feb.): 136-56.

Diermeier, Daniel, Keane, Michael, and Merlo, Antonio. 2005. “A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers.” American Economic Review 95: 347-73.

Ferejohn, John A. 1974. Pork Barrel Politics: Rivers and Harbors Legislation, 1947-1968. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Golden, Miriam and Picci, Lucio. 2005. “Proposal for a New Measure of Corruption, Illustrated with Italian Data.” Economics & Politics 17 (March): 37-75.

Golden, Miriam and Picci, Lucio. 2008. “Pork Barrel Politics in Postwar Italy, 1953-1994.” American Journal of Political Science 52 (April): 268-89.

Imbens, Guido W. and Lemieux, Thomas. 2008. “Regression Discontinuity Designs: A Guide to Practice.” Journal of Econometrics, 142 (Feb): 615-35.

Katz, Jonathan N. and King, Gary. 1999. “A Statistical Model for Multiparty Electoral Data.” American Political Science Review 93 (March): 15-32.

Katz, Richard S. and Bardi, Luciano. 1980. “Preference Voting and Turnover in Italian Parliamentary Elections.” American Journal of Political Science 24 (Feb.): 97-114.

Katz, Richard S. 1986. “Intraparty Preference Voting.” In Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences, ed. Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart. New York: Agathon Press.

Lancaster, Thomas D. 1986. “Electoral Structures and Pork Barrel Politics.” International Political Science Review 7 (Jan.): 67-81.

Lee, David S. 2008. “Randomized Experiments from Non-Random Selection in U.S. House Elections.” Journal of Econometrics 142: 675-97.

Lee, David S. and Lemieux, Thomas. 2010. “Regression Discontinuity Designs in Economics.” Journal of Economic Literature 48 (June): 281-355.

Linden, Leigh L. 2004. “Are Incumbents Really Advantaged? The Preference for Non-Incumbents in Indian National Elections.” Unpublished paper.

Merlo, Antonio, Galasso, Vincenzo, Landi, Massimiliano, and Mattozzi, Andrea. 2009.

“The Labor Market of Italian Politicians.” Penn Institute for Economic Research Working Paper 09-024.

Nichter, Simeon. 2008. “Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot.” American Political Science Review 102: 19-31.

Persson, Torsten and Tabellini, Guido. 2003. The Economic Effects of Constitutions. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Roodman, David. 2006. “How to Do xtabond2: An Introduction to ‘Difference’ and ‘System’ GMM in Stata.” Center for Global Development, Working Paper 103. December.

Stokes, Susan C. 2005. “Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina.” American Political Science Review 99 (Aug.): 315-25.

Uppal, Yogesh. 2005. “The (Dis)advantaged Incumbents: Estimating Incumbency Effects in Indian State Legislatures.” Unpublished paper.

Van de Ven, Wynard P. M. M. and Van Pragg, Bernard M.S. 1981. “The Demand for Deductibles in Private Health Insurance: A Probit Model with Sample Selection.” Journal of Econometrics 17: 229-52.