Quantum and algorithmic Bayesian mechanisms

Wu, Haoyang (2011): Quantum and algorithmic Bayesian mechanisms.

Abstract

Bayesian implementation concerns decision making problems when agents have incomplete information. This paper proposes that the traditional sufficient conditions for Bayesian implementation shall be amended by virtue of a quantum Bayesian mechanism. Furthermore, by using an algorithmic Bayesian mechanism, this amendment holds in the macro world too.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Bayesian implementation; Quantum game theory; Mechanism design
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations

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