Governance and Enterprise Restructuring in Southeast Europe – gross domestic product and foreign direct investments

Apostolov, Mico (2011): Governance and Enterprise Restructuring in Southeast Europe – gross domestic product and foreign direct investments.

Abstract

This paper is to be concerned with the corporate governance mechanisms’ influence on governance and enterprise restructuring in Southeast Europe (Western Balkans) transition economies: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia.

The institutional changes and corporate governance mechanisms in national governance systems are essentially important for the transition process, thus there are specificities of corporate governance mechanisms in transition economies that indicate the progress towards market based economy. Most notable are: the market-based corporate governance mechanisms, management-structure based corporate governance mechanisms, ownership structure, boards of directors, management compensations schemes, that is, management structures and financial structures. Corporate governance mechanisms are seen through governance and enterprise restructuring indicator which has already established link to gross domestic product and foreign direct investments in the literature.

The data set is of Southeast European economies, and will be examined the interrelationships between governance and enterprise restructuring, set of policies that influence the governance patterns, gross domestic product and foreign direct investments.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: governance, enterprise restructuring, corporate governance, transition, Southeast Europe
• Subjects: O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O1 - Economic Development > O11 - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development; G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G38 - Government Policy and Regulation; G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G32 - Financing Policy ; Financial Risk and Risk Management ; Capital and Ownership Structure ; Value of Firms ; Goodwill; P - Economic Systems > P3 - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions > P31 - Socialist Enterprises and Their Transitions; G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G30 - General; L - Industrial Organization > L3 - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise > L33 - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprises and Nonprofit Institutions ; Privatization ; Contracting Out

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