Indépendance de la banque centrale et efficacité de la politique économique

Ndjana, Willy Freddie and Alia, Didier Yélognissè and Mendo, Paulin (2009): Indépendance de la banque centrale et efficacité de la politique économique.

Abstract

This paper examines the different interactions that can exist between an independent central bank and the economic policy in a country. The focal point of this survey is based on the « temporal incoherence »problem raised in the years 1970 by Prescott and Kydland. These two authors arrived to the conclusion that, the separation between public authorities and monetary authorities would guarantee an economic stability. The rush observed since some years of the central banks toward the independence vis-`a-vis of public authorities contributed to carry a decisive stroke to the economic policy’s efficiency thus.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• English Title: Central bank independence and effectiveness of economic policy
• Language: French
• Keywords: Central bank, independance, temporal incoherence, economic policy
• Subjects: E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E0 - General > E02 - Institutions and the Macroeconomy; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit > E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies

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