Pelosse, Yohan (2011): Inter and intragroup conflicts as a foundation for contest success functions.

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Abstract
This paper introduces a notion of partitioned correlated equilibrium that extends Aumann's correlated equilibrium concept (1974, 1987). This concept captures the noncooperative interactions arising simultaneously within and between groups. We build on this notion in order to provide a foundation for contest success functions (CSFs) in a game wherein contests arise endogenously. Our solution concept and analysis are general enough to give a foundation for any model of contest using standard equilibrium concepts like e.g., Nash, BayesianNash or PerfectNash equilibria. In our environment, popular CSFs can be interpreted as a list of equilibrium conjectures held by players whenever they contemplate deviating from the ``peaceful outcome'' of the ``group formation game''. Our setup allows to relate the form of prominent CSFs with some textbook examples of quasilinear utility functions, social utility functions in the spirit of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and nonexpected models of utility a la Quiggin (1981, 1982). We also show that our framework can accommodate situations in which agents cannot correlate their actions.
Item Type:  MPRA Paper 

Original Title:  Inter and intragroup conflicts as a foundation for contest success functions 
Language:  English 
Keywords:  Contest success functions; Correlated equilibrium; Inter and intragroup conflicts; Induced contests 
Subjects:  D  Microeconomics > D7  Analysis of Collective DecisionMaking > D74  Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7  Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72  Noncooperative Games 
Item ID:  31468 
Depositing User:  Yohan Pelosse 
Date Deposited:  12. Jun 2011 15:16 
Last Modified:  16. Feb 2013 14:09 
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URI:  https://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/id/eprint/31468 