Kukushkin, Nikolai S. (2011): Monotone comparative statics: Changes in preferences vs changes in the feasible set.
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Let a preference ordering on a lattice be perturbed. As is well known, single crossing conditions are necessary and sufficient for a monotone reaction of the set of optimal choices from every chain. Actually, there are several interpretations of monotonicity and several corresponding single crossing conditions. We describe restrictions on the preferences that ensure a monotone reaction of the set of optimal choices from every sublattice whenever a perturbation of preferences satisfies the corresponding single crossing condition. Quasisupermodularity is necessary if we want monotonicity in every conceivable sense; otherwise, weaker conditions will do.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Monotone comparative statics: Changes in preferences vs changes in the feasible set|
|Keywords:||strategic complementarity; monotone comparative statics; best response correspondence; single crossing; quasisupermodularity|
|Subjects:||C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C6 - Mathematical Methods ; Programming Models ; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling > C61 - Optimization Techniques ; Programming Models ; Dynamic Analysis
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games
|Depositing User:||Nikolai S. Kukushkin|
|Date Deposited:||16. Jun 2011 13:19|
|Last Modified:||20. Feb 2013 14:59|
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