Olivier, Bos (2011): Charitable asymmetric bidders.
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Recent papers show that all-pay auctions are better at raising money for charity than first-price auctions with symmetric bidders and under incomplete information. Yet, this result is lost with sufficiently asymmetric bidders and under complete information. In this paper, we consider a framework on charity auctions with asymmetric bidders under some incomplete information. We find that all-pay auctions still earn more money than first-price auction. Thus, all-pay auctions should be seriously considered when one wants to organize a charity auction.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Charitable asymmetric bidders|
|Keywords:||All-pay auctions, Charity, Externalities|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D62 - Externalities
D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D44 - Auctions
D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D64 - Altruism ; Philanthropy
|Depositing User:||Olivier Bos|
|Date Deposited:||28. Jun 2011 13:32|
|Last Modified:||19. Feb 2013 01:30|
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