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Items where Subject is "D44 - Auctions"

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Number of items at this level: 186.


Ahmed, Rafayal (2018): Dynamic Screening with Differentially Informed Principals.

Alcalde, Jose and Dahm, Matthias (2011): Competition for procurement shares.

Alcalde, Jose and Dahm, Matthias (2010): On the Complete Information First--Price Auction and its Intuitive Solution.

Alvarez, Francisco and André, Francisco J. (2015): Auctioning emission permits in a leader-follower setting.

Alvarez, Francisco and André, Francisco J. and Mazón, Cristina (2016): Assigning pollution permits: are uniform auctions efficient?

Amegashie, J. Atsu (2012): A nested contest: Tullock meets the All-Pay Auction.

An, Yonghong and Tang, Xun (2015): Identification and Estimation of Auctions with Incomplete Contracts: A Structural Analysis of California Highway Construction Projects.

Aryal, Gaurab and Gabrielli, Maria F. (2012): Is Collusion Proof Auction Expensive? Estimates from Highway Procurements.

Aryal, Gaurab and Gabrielli, Maria F. and Vuong, Quang (2014): Semiparametric Estimation of First-Price Auction Models.

Atakan, Alp Enver and Ekmekci, Mehmet (2016): Market Selection and the Information Content of Prices.

Athias, Laure and Nunez, Antonio (2008): The more the merrier? Number of bidders, information dispersion, renegotiation and winner’s curse in toll road concessions.


Bahamin, Payam and Cebula, Richard and Foley, Maggie and Houmes, Robert (2011): The Demand for Treasury Securities at Auction. Published in: Academy of Economics and Finance Journal , Vol. 3, No. 1 (20 December 2012): pp. 23-32.

Banerjee, Shraman (2021): Treating Symmetric Buyers Asymmetrically.

Behringer, Stefan (2005): Equilibrium Market and Pricing Structures in Virtual Platform Duopoly.

Beraldo, Sergio and Filoso, Valerio and Marco, Stimolo (2013): Endogenous Preferences and Conformity: Evidence From a Pilot Experiment.

Berman, Ron and Katona, Zsolt (2010): The Role of Search Engine Optimization in Search Rankings.

Bertoletti, Paolo (2006): On the reserve price in all-pay auctions with complete information and lobbying games.

Bertoletti, Paolo (2006): A note on the Exclusion Principle.

Bhirombhakdi, Kornpob and Potipiti, Tanapong (2012): Practically Implementable Auction for a Good with Countervailing Positive Externalities.

Biran, Omer (2011): Core stable bidding rings in independent private value auctions with externalities.

Bobkova, Nina (2017): Asymmetric Budget Constraints in a First Price Auction.

Bos, Olivier (2015): Charity Auctions for the Happy Few.

Bos, Olivier (2011): Wars of attrition and all-pay auctions with stochastic competition.

Bos, Olivier and Ranger, Martin (2013): All-Pay Auctions with Polynomial Rewards.

Bos, Olivier and Truyts, Tom (2017): Auctions with Signaling Concerns.

Bourjade, Sylvain (2003): Strategic Price Discounting and Rationing in Uniform Price Auctions.

Bramsen, Jens-Martin (2008): Bid early and get it cheap - Timing effects in Internet auctions.

Bramsen, Jens-Martin (2008): Learning to bid, but not to quit – Experience and Internet auctions.

Bramsen, Jens-Martin (2008): A pseudo-endowment effect in internet auctions.

Breitmoser, Yves (2011): Binomial menu auctions in government formation.

Breitmoser, Yves (2015): Knowing me, imagining you: Projection and overbidding in auctions.

Breitmoser, Yves (2016): Knowing me, imagining you: Projection and overbidding in auctions.

Brosig-Koch, Jeannette and Heinrich, Timo and Sterner, Martin (2023): Bilateral communication in procurement auctions.

Burkart, Mike (2009): Analyse de l'impact des coûts de participation sur la stratégie des enchérisseurs dans les Prises de contrôle.

Börgers, Tilman and Cox, Ingemar and Pesendorfer, Martin and Petricek, Vaclav (2008): Equilibrium Bids in Sponsored Search Auctions: Theory and Evidence.


Canavari, Maurizio and Drichoutis, Andreas C. and Lusk, Jayson L. and Nayga, Rodolfo (2018): How to run an experimental auction: A review of recent advances.

Cao, Xiaoyong and Tian, Guoqiang (2007): Second Price Auctions with Valuations and Participation Costs Both Privately Informed.

Cao, Xiaoyong and Tian, Guoqiang (2012): Second-Price Auctions with Different Participation Costs. Forthcoming in: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy

Cerezo Sánchez, David (2017): An Optimal ICO Mechanism.

Chakravarty, Surajeet and Kaplan, Todd R. (2006): Optimal Allocation without Transfer Payments.

Chang, Wei-Shiun and Salmon, Timothy C. and Saral, Krista Jabs (2013): Procurement Auctions with Renegotiation and Wealth Constraints.

Charlin, Ventura and Cifuentes, Arturo (2013): A new financial metric for the art market.

Chatterjee, Rittwik and Chattopadhyay, Srobonti (2015): Competition and Auctioning Licenses.

Chattopadhyay, Srobonti and Chatterjee, Rittwik (2013): Selling a Cost Reducing Production Technique through Auction in a Duopolistic Industry.

Che, Xiaogang (2009): Internet auctions with a temporary buyout option.

Chen, Jong-Rong and Chen, Kong-Pin and Chou, Chien-Fu and Huang, Ching-I (2006): A dynamic model of auctions with buy-it-now: theory and evidence.

Chen, Kong-Pin and Liu, Yu-Sheng and Yu, Ya-Ting (2012): The Seller's listing strategy in online auctions: evidence from eBay.

Chen, Yongmin and Li, Jianpei (2015): Bundled procurement.

Chi, Chang Koo and Murto, Pauli and Valimaki, Juuso (2017): All-Pay Auctions with Affiliated Values.

Chiappinelli, Olga (2014): An elimination contest with non-sunk bids.

Choo, Lawrence and Kaplan, Todd R. and Zhou, Xiaoyu (2019): Can auctions select people by their level-k types?

Chow, YuenLeng and Yavas, Abdullah (2008): Auctions with Positive Synergies: Experimental Evidence.

Colombo, Stefano and Ma, Siyu and Sen, Debapriya and Tauman, Yair (2021): Equivalence between fixed fee and ad valorem profit royalty. Forthcoming in: Journal of Public Economic Theory

Corrigan, Jay and Drichoutis, Andreas and Lusk, Jayson and Nayga, Rodolfo and Rousu, Matt (2011): Repeated Rounds with Price Feedback in Experimental Auction Valuation: An Adversarial Collaboration.

Cotton, Christopher (2015): Competing for Attention.

Cotton, Christopher (2007): Informational Lobbying and Competition for Access.

Cotton, Christopher (2007): Multiple-bidding in auctions as bidders become confident of their private valuations.


Damianov, Damian (2008): Seller Competition by Mechanism Design.

De Chiara, Alessandro (2015): Holding an Auction for the Wrong Project.

De Silva, Dakshina G. and Hubbard, Timothy P. and Kosmopoulou, Georgia (2015): Efficacy of a bidder training program: lessons from LINC.

De Silva, Dakshina G. and Kosmopoulou, Georgia and Lamarche, Carlos (2007): The Effect of Information on the Bidding and Survival of Entrants in Procurement Auctions.

De Silva, Dakshina G. and Kosmopoulou, Georgia and Pagel, Beatrice and Peeters, Ronald (2010): The impact of timing on bidding behavior in procurement auctions of contracts with private costs.

Deb, Rahul (2008): Optimal Contracting Of New Experience Goods.

Dechenaux, Emmanuel and Kovenock, Dan (2007): Tacit collusion and capacity withholding in repeated uniform price auctions. Published in: Rand Journal of Economics , Vol. 38, No. 4 (2007): pp. 1044-1069.

Di Gaetano, Luigi (2011): A model of descending auction with hidden starting price and endogenous price decrease.

Donna, Javier and Espin-Sanchez, Jose (2017): Complements and Substitutes in Sequential Auctions: The Case of Water Auctions.

Donna, Javier and Espin-Sanchez, Jose (2018): Complements and Substitutes in Sequential Auctions: The Case of Water Auctions. Published in: RAND Journal of Economics , Vol. 49, No. 1 (2 February 2018): pp. 87-127.

Donna, Javier and Schenone, Pablo and Veramendi, Gregory (2015): Frictions in Internet Auctions with Many Traders: a Counterexample.

Drichoutis, Andreas and Nayga, Rodolfo (2019): Game form recognition in preference elicitation, cognitive abilities and cognitive load.

Dubra, Juan (2006): Asymmetric English Auctions Revisited.

Dubra, Juan and Echenique, Federico and Manelli, Alejandro (2007): English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem.

de Rus, Gines and Nombela, Gustavo (2003): Concesiones de plazo variable para la construcción y explotación de autopistas.

de Rus, Gines and Nombela, Gustavo (2000): Least Present Value of Net Revenue: a new auction-mechanism for highway concessions.

de Rus, Gines and Trujillo, Lourdes and Romero, Manuel (2000): Participacion privada en la construccion y explotacion de carreteras de peaje. Published in: Fundación fondo para la investigación económica y social (confederacion espanola de cajas de ahorro, ceca) (2000)


Eisenhuth, Roland and Ewers, Mara (2010): Auctions with Loss Averse Bidders.

Erdogdu, Erkan (2015): Asymmetric volatility in European day-ahead power markets: A comparative microeconomic analysis. Published in: Energy Economics , Vol. 56, No. May 2016 (11 April 2016): pp. 398-409.

Espinosa, Miguel and Forero, German and Villaneda, Felipe (2011): The practice of the auction theory: The Colombian case.


Faherty, Emily and Huang, Kevin and Land, Robert (2017): The Amazon Monopoly: Is Amazon’s Private Label Business the Tipping Point?

Fischer, Sven and Guth, Werner and Kaplan, Todd and Zultan, Roi (2014): Auctions and Leaks: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation.

Foucart, Renaud and Friedrichsen, Jana (2016): Bidding for network size.


Gelder, Alan and Kovenock, Dan and Sheremeta, Roman (2015): Behavior in All-Pay Auctions with Ties.

Glowicka, Ela and Beck, Jonathan (2006): A note on reserve price commitments in the Vickrey auction.

Gorecki, Paul (2020): The Berendsen (Elis)/Kings Laundry Merger: Three Into Two Won’t Go.

Gorecki, Paul (2019): Reforming the Regulation of Household Waste Collection Services in Ireland: the Competition and Consumer Protection Commission Study.

Gurnani, Haresh and Ray, Tridip (2003): A Procurement Auction Model Under Supplier Uncertainty.

Gács, János and Karimov, Il'dar and Schneider, Christoph (1992): Small Scale Privatization in Eastern Europe and Russia from a Historical and Comparative Perspective. Published in: IIASA Working Paper No. WP-92-067 (September 1992): pp. 1-36.


Hafalir, Isa E. and Yektas, Hadi (2010): Selling Goods of Unknown Quality: Forward versus Spot Auctions.

Harbord, David and Pagnozzi, Marco (2014): Britain's electricity capacity auctions: lessons from Colombia and New England.

Hellerstein, Daniel and Higgins, Nathaniel (2010): The Effective Use of Limited Information: Do Bid Maximums Reduce Procurement Cost in Asymmetric Auctions? Published in: Agricultural and Resource Economics Review , Vol. 2, No. 39 (April 2010): pp. 288-304.

Henderson, Daniel J. and List, John A. and Millimet, Daniel L. and Parmeter, Christopher F. and Price, Michael K. (2008): Imposing Monotonicity Nonparametrically in First-Price Auctions.

Hernando, Andres and Villena, Mauricio and Apablaza, Valentina (2023): Optimal Bidding for a Bundle of Power Transmission Infrastructure Works.

Hu, Youxin and Kagel, John and Xu, Xiaoshu and Ye, Lixin (2012): Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Auctions with Negative Externalities.

Huang, Ching-I (2008): Are eBay auctions efficient? A model with buyer entries.


JIAO, FENG (2011): Bidding behaviors in eBay auctions: secret reservation price and endogenous entry. Published in: Journal of Economics and Behavioral Studies , Vol. 3, No. 5 (November 2011): pp. 326-331.


Kaluzhsky, Mikhail (2011): Дропшиппинг – революционная форма продвижения товара в условиях мирового экономического кризиса. Published in: Менеджмент и маркетинг в инновационной экономике / Под ред. проф. А.И. Ковалёва. (2011): pp. 172-185.

Kaplan, Todd R (2008): Communication of Preferences in Contests for Contracts.

Kaplan, Todd R and Wettstein, David (2016): Two-Stage Contests with Preferences over Style.

Kaplan, Todd R and Wettstein, David (2010): The optimal design of rewards in contests.

Kaplan, Todd R and Zamir, Shmuel (2014): Advances in Auctions. Forthcoming in: Handbook of Game Theory , Vol. 4,

Kaplan, Todd R and Zamir, Shmuel (2011): Multiple equilibria in asymmetric first-price auctions.

Kasberger, Bernhard and Woodward, Kyle (2021): Bidding in Multi-Unit Auctions under Limited Information.

Kechagia, Varvara and Drichoutis, Andreas C. (2016): The effect of olfactory sensory cues on economic decision making.

Khezr, Peyman and Cumpston, Anne (2020): Multi-Unit Auctions: A Survey of Theoretical Literature.

Koc, Umit and Erdogdu, Oya Safinaz (2005): Türk Telekom A.Ş.’nin Özelleştirilmesi: Oyun Teorisi Perspektifinden Bir Değerlendirme.

Kotowski, Maciej and Li, Fei (2011): On the continuous equilibria of affiliated-value, all-pay auctions with private budget constraints.

Kuehn, Joseph (2016): Estimating Auctions with Externalities: The Case of USFS Timber Auctions.

Kumar, Ujjwal and Roy, Souvik (2021): Local incentive compatibility in ordinal type-spaces.

Kumru, Cagri and Yektas, Hadi (2008): Optimal Multi-Object Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers.


Lamping, Jennifer (2008): Ignorance Is Bliss: Matching in Auctions with an Uninformed Seller.

Lamping, Jennifer (2008): The Value of Commitment in Auctions with Matching.

Lamping, Jennifer (2007): The Value of Information in Auctions with Default Risk.

Larson, Nathan and Elmaghraby, Wedad (2008): Procurement auctions with avoidable fixed costs: an experimental approach.

Le, Phuong (2015): Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions with Budget Constraints.

Le, Phuong (2014): Modified VCG Mechanisms in Combinatorial Auctions with Budget Constraints.

Li, Shengyu and Tian, Guoqiang (2008): Equilibria in Second Price Auctions with Information Acquisition.

Lu, Jingfeng (2006): Auctions design with private costs of valuation discovery.

Lu, Jingfeng (2006): Endogenous entry and auctions design with private participation costs.

Lu, Jingfeng (2006): Unifying Identity-Specific and Financial Externalities in Auction Design.

Lu, Jingfeng (2006): When and how to dismantle nuclear weapons.

Lu, Jingfeng and Perrigne, Isabelle (2006): Estimating risk aversion from ascending and sealed-bid auctions: the case of timber auction data.


Marini, Marco A. and Corchon, Luis (2016): Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization: An Introduction. Forthcoming in: Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization (10 September 2017): pp. 1-15.

Marmer, Vadim and Shneyerov, Artyom (2006): Quantile-Based Nonparametric Inference for First-Price Auctions.

Masili, Gustavo (2006): Auction with aftermarket for budget constrained bidders.

Mathur, Kritika and Sinha, Pankaj (2014): Dynamics of Day-Ahead Trading of Electricity in India.

Michael, Friedrich and Ignatov, Dmitry I. (2019): General Game Playing B-to-B Price Negotiations. Published in: CEUR Workshop Proceedings , Vol. 2479, (26 September 2019): pp. 89-99.

Monostori, Zoltan (2013): Diszkriminatív áras és egyenáras aukciók. Published in: Közgazdasági Szemle , Vol. 10, No. 60 (October 2013): pp. 1048-1074.

Morone, Andrea and Nemore, Francesco and Nuzzo, Simone (2018): Experimental Evidence on Tax Salience and Tax Incidence.


Ng, Travis and Chong, Terence and Xin, Du (2009): The Value of Superstitions.

Nombela, Gustavo and de Rus, Gines (2001): Auctions for Infrastructure Concessions with Demand Uncertainty and Unknown Costs.


Olivier, Bos (2011): Charitable asymmetric bidders.


Pagnozzi, Marco and Saral, Krista J. (2009): Auctions with Limited Liability through Default or Resale.

Pagnozzi, Marco and Saral, Krista J. (2015): Efficiency in Auctions with (Failed) Resale.

Pagnozzi, Marco and Saral, Krista J. (2016): Entry by Successful Speculators in Auctions with Resale.

Pagnozzi, Marco and Saral, Krista Jabs (2013): Multi-Object Auctions with Resale: An Experimental Analysis.

Papakonstantinou, A. and Rogers, A and Gerding, E. H. and Jennings, N. R. (2010): Mechanism Design for the truthful elicitation of costly probabilistic estimates in Distributed Information Systems. Published in: Artificial Intelligence , Vol. 175, No. 2 (February 2011): pp. 648-672.

Papakonstantinou, A. and Rogers, A. and Gerding, E. H and Jennings, N. R. (2010): Mechanism Design for eliciting probabilistic estimates from multiple suppliers with unknown costs and limited precision. Published in: LNBIP: Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce. Designing Trading Strategies and Mechanisms for Electronic Markets. E. David et al. (Eds.): AMEC/TADA 2009 No. 59 (2010): pp. 102-116.

Papakonstantinou, A. and Rogers, A. and Gerding, E. H. and Jennings, N. R (2008): A Truthful Two-Stage Mechanism for Eliciting Probabilistic Estimates with Unknown Costs. Published in: Proceedings of the 18th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI'08) : pp. 448-452.

Parisio, Lucia and Bosco, Bruno (2006): Electricity prices and cross-border trade: volume and strategy effects.

Parkhurst, Gregory M and Shogren, Jason F (2011): How Losses affect Bidding Behavior in Vickrey Auctions.

Pearson, Matthew and Schipper, Burkhard C (2009): Menstrual cycle and competitive bidding.

Pearson, Matthew and Schipper, Burkhard C (2009): The Visible Hand: Finger ratio (2D:4D) and competitive behavior.


Remoundou, Kyriaki and Drichoutis, Andreas and Koundouri, Phoebe (2010): Warm glow in charitable auctions: Are the WEIRDos driving the results?

Rosa, Benjamin (2020): Affirmative Action Subcontracting Regulations in Dynamic Procurement Auctions.

Rosa, Benjamin (2021): Bid Credits in Simultaneous Ascending Auctions.

Rosa, Benjamin (2018): Resident Bid Preference, Affiliation, and Procurement Competition: Evidence from New Mexico.

Rosa, Benjamin (2016): Subcontracting Requirements and the Cost of Government Procurement.

Rosato, Antonio (2014): Loss Aversion in Sequential Auctions: Endogenous Interdependence, Informational Externalities and the "Afternoon Effect".

Rosato, Antonio (2008): “Matching Auctions” for Hostile Takeovers: A Model with Endogenous Target.

Rosato, Antonio and Tymula, Agnieszka (2016): Loss Aversion and Competition in Vickrey Auctions: Money Ain't No Good.

Rosato, Antonio and Tymula, Agnieszka (2022): A novel experimental test of truthful bidding in second-price auctions with real objects.

Rosenthal, Dale W.R. and Thomas, Nordia Diana Marie and Wang, Hefei (2013): Transaction taxes in a price maker/taker market.

Roy, Souvik and Kumar, Ujjwal (2021): Local incentive compatibility in non-convex type-spaces.

Roy Chowdhury, Prabal (2006): Controlling Collusion in Auctions: The Role of Ceilings and Reserve Prices.

Ruijgrok, Matthijs (2012): A single-item continuous double auction game.


Said, Maher (2010): Auctions with Dynamic Populations: Efficiency and Revenue Maximization.

Said, Maher (2008): Information Revelation in Sequential Ascending Auctions.

Said, Maher (2009): Sequential Auctions with Randomly Arriving Buyers.

Saral, Krista Jabs (2010): Speculation and Demand Reduction in English Clock Auctions with Resale.

Shachat, Jason (2009): Procuring Commodities: First Price Sealed Bid or English Auction?

Shachat, Jason and Tan, Lijia (2019): How Auctioneers Set Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Reserve Prices in English Auctions.

Shachat, Jason and Tan, Lijia (2012): An experimental investigation of auctions and bargaining in procurement.

Shachat, Jason and Wei, Lijia (2013): Discrete Rule Learning and the Bidding of the Sexes.

Shunda, Nicholas (2009): Auctioning with Aspirations: Keep Them Low (Enough).

Singh, Bhupal and Dhal, Sarat C. (1998): Repo auction formats, bidders' behaviour and money market response in India. Published in: Reserve Bank of India Occasional Papers , Vol. 19, No. 3 (30 September 1998)

Sinha, Pankaj and Mathur, Kritika (2016): Empirical Analysis of Developments in the Day Ahead Electricity Markets in India.

Spagnolo, Giancarlo and Albano, Gian Luigi and Bianchi, Milo (2006): Bid avarage methods in Procurement. Published in: Rivista di politica economica No. No. I – II : pp. 41-64.

Srhoj, Stjepan and Dragojević, Melko (2021): Public procurement and supplier job creation: Insights from auctions.

Srhoj, Stjepan and Dragojević, Melko (2021): Public procurement and supplier job creation: Insights from auctions.

Sui, Yong (2006): All-pay auctions with resale.

salant, david j (2010): Sequential auction and auction design.


Tchoffo, Rodrigue and Ngouhouo, Ibrahim and Nkemgha, Guivis (2020): Trade Liberalization and Macroeconomic Performance in Cameroon: An Imperfect Competition Approach.

Teresa, Briz and Drichoutis, Andreas and Nayga, Rodolfo and House, Lisa (2011): Examining Projection Bias in Experimental Auctions: The Role of Hunger and Immediate Gratification.

Tian, Guoqiang (2010): On the Existence of Price Equilibrium in Economies with Excess Demand Functions.

Tian, Guoqiang and Xiao, Mingjun (2007): Endogenous Information Acquisition on Opponents' Valuations in Multidimensional First Price Auctions.

Tian, Guoqiang and Xiao, Mingjun (2009): Vickrey Auctions with Sequential and Costly Participation.


Vassilopoulos, Achilleas and Drichoutis, Andreas C. and Nayga, Rodolfo (2018): Loss Aversion, Expectations and Anchoring in the BDM Mechanism.

Virag, Gabor (2009): First-price auctions with resale: the case of many bidders.

Viviani, Carlo (2010): The Italian Position in the Energy and Climate Change Negotiations. Published in: Review of Economic Conditions in Italy , Vol. 2010, No. 2 (January 2011): pp. 231-278.


Winter, Jennifer L. (2010): Buying Anonymity: An Investigation of Petroleum and Natural Gas Lease Auctions.

Wittwer, Milena (2017): Centralizing Disconnected Markets? An Irrelevance Result.

Wu, Hanxiao and Qin, Botao (2019): An experimental test of the solemn oath in eliciting sincere preferences.

Wu, Haoyang (2011): A novel result on the revenue equivalence theorem.


Yokote, Koji (2017): Application of the discrete separation theorem to auctions.

Yokote, Koji (2018): The discrete Kuhn-Tucker theorem and its application to auctions.


Zhang, nan and Qin, Botao (2020): Reference point adaptation and air quality – Experimental evidence with anti-PM 2.5 facemasks from China.

Zhou, Tim (2015): Failed bank auctions and externalities.

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