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Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions with Budget Constraints

Le, Phuong (2015): Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions with Budget Constraints.

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Abstract

This paper studies combinatorial auctions with budget-constrained bidders from a mechanism design perspective. I search for mechanisms that are incentive compatible, individually rational, symmetric, non-wasteful and non-bossy. First focusing on the greedy domain, in which any increase in a bidder's valuation always exceeds his budget, I derive the unique mechanism, called the Iterative Second Price Auction. For the general domain, however, no such mechanism exists.

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  • Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions with Budget Constraints. (deposited 28 Aug 2015 05:15) [Currently Displayed]
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