Advances in Auctions

Kaplan, Todd R and Zamir, Shmuel (2014): Advances in Auctions. Forthcoming in: Handbook of Game Theory , Vol. 4,

Abstract

As a selling mechanism, auctions have acquired a central position in the free market economy all over the globe. This development has deepened, broadened, and expanded the theory of auctions in new directions. This chapter is intended as a selective update of some of the developments and applications of auction theory in the two decades since Wilson (1992) wrote the previous Handbook chapter on this topic.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Auctions; Private-Value Auctions; Multi-Unit Auctions; All-Pay Auctions; Resale; Position Auctions; Dynamic Auctions; Spectrum Auctions; Monotone Equilibrium
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games; D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D44 - Auctions; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design; H - Public Economics > H5 - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies > H57 - Procurement

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