Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Asymmetric Budget Constraints in a First Price Auction

Bobkova, Nina (2017): Asymmetric Budget Constraints in a First Price Auction.

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Abstract

I solve a first-price auction for two bidders with asymmetric budget distributions and known valuations for one object. I show that in any equilibrium, the expected utilities and bid distributions of both bidders are unique. If budgets are sufficiently low, the bidders will bid their entire budget in any equilibrium. For sufficiently high budgets, mass points in the equilibrium strategies arise. A less restrictive budget distribution could make both bidders strictly worse off. If the budget distribution of a bidder is dominated by the budget distribution of his opponent in the reverse-hazard rate order, the weaker bidder will bid more aggressively than his stronger opponent. In contrast to existing results for symmetric budget distributions, with asymmetric budget distributions, a second-price auction can yield a strictly higher revenue than a first-price auction. Under an additional assumption, I derive the unique equilibrium utilities and bid distributions of both bidders in an all-pay auction.

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