Türk Telekom A.Ş.’nin Özelleştirilmesi: Oyun Teorisi Perspektifinden Bir Değerlendirme

Koc, Umit and Erdogdu, Oya Safinaz (2005): Türk Telekom A.Ş.’nin Özelleştirilmesi: Oyun Teorisi Perspektifinden Bir Değerlendirme.

Abstract

We focused on two main questions that should be asked during the privatization of telecommunication sector in order to achieve the goal of privatization: What to sell and how to sell? Emphasizing the establishment of an efficient telecomunication market and maximization of the revenue from this privatization, we made a survey on some of the game theorists’ working papers and answered “what to sell and how to sell” questions with a framework of efficient auction mechanism for efficient telecommunication sector.

Bu çalışmada telekomünikasyon sektörü özelleştirilirken sorulması gereken iki önemli soru üzerinde durduk: (i)Hangi mal (ii)hangi yöntemle satılmalı ki özelleştirme amacına ulaşsın. Bu bağlamda Türk Telekom A.Ş’nin özelleştirmesinin amacı olan piyasada etkinliğin sağlanması ve hükümetin mümkün olan en yüksek geliri elde etmesi vurguları çerçevesinde oyun teorisyenlerinin çalışmalarını veri aldık ve oluşabilecek sorunları da göz önüne alarak bu sektör için en verimli yöntem ve satılacak malın özellikleri için bir öneri oluşturmaya çalıştık.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• English Title: Privatization of Turkish Telecom Company: An Assessment from Game Theory Perspective
• Language: Turkish
• Keywords: Privatization, Efficiency in Auctions, Game Theory, Turkish Telecom Company, Imperfect Information Özelleştirme, İhalelerde etkinlik, Oyun Teorisi, Türk Telekom A.Ş., Eksik bilgi
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D44 - Auctions; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E2 - Consumption, Saving, Production, Investment, Labor Markets, and Informal Economy > E22 - Investment ; Capital ; Intangible Capital ; Capacity; L - Industrial Organization > L9 - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities > L96 - Telecommunications

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