Dubra, Juan and Echenique, Federico and Manelli, Alejandro (2007): English auctions and the StolperSamuelson theorem.

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Abstract
We prove that the English auction (with bidders that need not be ex ante identical and may have interdependent valuations) has an efficient ex post equilibrium. We establish this result for environments where it has not been previously obtained. We also prove two versions of the StolperSamuelson theorem, one for economies with n goods and n factors, and one for nonsquare economies. Similar assumptions and methods underlie these seemingly unrelated results.
Item Type:  MPRA Paper 

Original Title:  English auctions and the StolperSamuelson theorem 
Language:  English 
Keywords:  English auctions, StolperSamuelson, single crossing 
Subjects:  F  International Economics > F1  Trade > F11  Neoclassical Models of Trade D  Microeconomics > D4  Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D44  Auctions C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C6  Mathematical Methods ; Programming Models ; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling > C60  General 
Item ID:  8218 
Depositing User:  Juan Dubra 
Date Deposited:  10. Apr 2008 18:29 
Last Modified:  13. Feb 2013 15:24 
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URI:  https://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/id/eprint/8218 