Pivato, Marcus
(2011):
*Variable-population voting rules.*

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## Abstract

Let X be a set of social alternatives, and let V be a set of `votes' or `signals'. (We do not assume any structure on X or V). A `variable population voting rule' F takes any number of anonymous votes drawn from V as input, and produces a nonempty subset of X as output. The rule F satisfies `reinforcement' if, whenever two disjoint sets of voters independently select some subset Y of X, the union of these two sets will also select Y. We show that F satisfies reinforcement if and only if F is a `balance rule'. If F satisfies a form of neutrality, then F is satisfies reinforcement if and only if F is a scoring rule (with scores taking values in an abstract linearly ordered abelian group R); this generalizes a result of Myerson (1995). We also discuss the sense in which the balance or scoring representation of F is unique. Finally, we provide a characterization of two scoring rules: `formally utilitarian' voting and `range voting'. a

Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
---|---|

Original Title: | Variable-population voting rules |

Language: | English |

Keywords: | reinforcement; scoring rule; balance rule; linearly ordered abelian group; formal utilitarian; range voting |

Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations |

Item ID: | 31896 |

Depositing User: | Marcus Pivato |

Date Deposited: | 29 Jun 2011 03:09 |

Last Modified: | 02 Oct 2019 08:54 |

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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/31896 |