Pivato, Marcus (2011): Variablepopulation voting rules.

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Abstract
Let X be a set of social alternatives, and let V be a set of `votes' or `signals'. (We do not assume any structure on X or V). A `variable population voting rule' F takes any number of anonymous votes drawn from V as input, and produces a nonempty subset of X as output. The rule F satisfies `reinforcement' if, whenever two disjoint sets of voters independently select some subset Y of X, the union of these two sets will also select Y. We show that F satisfies reinforcement if and only if F is a `balance rule'. If F satisfies a form of neutrality, then F is satisfies reinforcement if and only if F is a scoring rule (with scores taking values in an abstract linearly ordered abelian group R); this generalizes a result of Myerson (1995). We also discuss the sense in which the balance or scoring representation of F is unique. Finally, we provide a characterization of two scoring rules: `formally utilitarian' voting and `range voting'. a
Item Type:  MPRA Paper 

Original Title:  Variablepopulation voting rules 
Language:  English 
Keywords:  reinforcement; scoring rule; balance rule; linearly ordered abelian group; formal utilitarian; range voting 
Subjects:  D  Microeconomics > D7  Analysis of Collective DecisionMaking > D71  Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations 
Item ID:  31896 
Depositing User:  Marcus Pivato 
Date Deposited:  29. Jun 2011 03:09 
Last Modified:  15. Feb 2013 14:45 
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URI:  https://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/id/eprint/31896 