An international agreement with full participation to tackle the stock of greenhouse gases

Kratzsch, Uwe and Sieg, Gernot and Stegemann, Ulrike (2011): An international agreement with full participation to tackle the stock of greenhouse gases.

Abstract

This paper analyzes greenhouse gas emissions that build up an atmospheric stock which depreciates over time. Weakly renegotiation-proof and subgame perfect equilibria in a game of international emission reduction exist if countries put a sufficiently high weight on future payoffs, even though there is a discontinuity in the required discount factor due to the integrity of the number of punishing countries. Treaties are easier to reach if the gas depreciates slowly.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: global warming; international agreement; weak renegotiation-proofness
• Subjects: H - Public Economics > H4 - Publicly Provided Goods > H41 - Public Goods; F - International Economics > F5 - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy > F53 - International Agreements and Observance ; International Organizations; Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q5 - Environmental Economics > Q54 - Climate ; Natural Disasters and Their Management ; Global Warming

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