Kratzsch, Uwe and Sieg, Gernot and Stegemann, Ulrike (2011): An international agreement with full participation to tackle the stock of greenhouse gases.
Download (3MB) | Preview
This paper analyzes greenhouse gas emissions that build up an atmospheric stock which depreciates over time. Weakly renegotiation-proof and subgame perfect equilibria in a game of international emission reduction exist if countries put a sufficiently high weight on future payoffs, even though there is a discontinuity in the required discount factor due to the integrity of the number of punishing countries. Treaties are easier to reach if the gas depreciates slowly.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||An international agreement with full participation to tackle the stock of greenhouse gases|
|Keywords:||global warming; international agreement; weak renegotiation-proofness|
|Subjects:||H - Public Economics > H4 - Publicly Provided Goods > H41 - Public Goods
F - International Economics > F5 - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy > F53 - International Agreements and Observance ; International Organizations
Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q5 - Environmental Economics > Q54 - Climate ; Natural Disasters and Their Management ; Global Warming
|Depositing User:||Gernot Sieg|
|Date Deposited:||04. Jul 2011 18:06|
|Last Modified:||21. Feb 2013 05:07|
Asheim, G.B., C.B. Froyn, J. Hovi and F.C. Menz, 2006, Regional versus global cooperation on climate control, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 51, 93-109.
Asheim, G.B. and B. Holtsmark, 2009, Renegotiation-Proof Climate Agree- ments with Full Participation: Conditions for Pareto-Efficiency, Environ- mental and Resource Economics 43, 519-533.
Barrett, S., 1999, A Theory of Full International Cooperation, Journal of Theoretical Politics 11, 519-541.
Barrett, S., 2002, Consensus Treaties, Journal of Institutional and Theo- retical Economics 158(4), 529-547.
Dutta, P.K. and R. Radner, 2009, A strategic analysis of global warming: Theory and some numbers, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 71, 187-209.
Farrell, J. and E. Maskin, 1989, Renegotiation in repeated games. Games and Economic Behavior 1, 327-360.
Froyn, C.B. and J. Hovi, 2008, A climate agreement with full participa- tion, Economics Letters 99, 317-319.
Houghten, J.T., L.G. Meira Filho, B.A. Callander, N. Harris, A. Katten- berg and K. Maskell (Eds.), 1995, Climate Change 1995 – The Science of Climate Change, Cambridge University Press. 10
Kratzsch, U., G. Sieg and U. Stegemann, A Full Participation Agreement On Global Emission Reduction Through Strategic Investments in R&D, TU Braunschweig Economics Department Working Paper No. 10, 2010.
Sinn, H.-W., 2008, Public policies against global warming: a supply side approach, International Tax and Public Finance 15, 360-394.