Public sector corruption and the probability of technological disasters

Yamamura, Eiji (2011): Public sector corruption and the probability of technological disasters.

Abstract

A growing number of works have explored the influence of institution on the outcomes of disasters and accidents from the viewpoint of political economy. This paper focuses on the probability of the occurrence of disasters rather than disaster outcomes. Using panel data from 98 countries, this paper examines how public sector corruption is associated with the probability of technological disasters. It was found that public sector corruption raises the probability of technological disasters. This result is robust when endogeneity bias is controlled.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Corruption, Institution, Disasters, Risk
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D73 - Bureaucracy ; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations ; Corruption; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty; Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q5 - Environmental Economics > Q54 - Climate ; Natural Disasters and Their Management ; Global Warming

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