The transfer space

Friedrich, T. (2010): The transfer space.

Abstract

The coordinates of the transfer space are loss of the source, gain of the sink and cost to both sides and compares the coupled gain and loss of two single parties to gain or loss of the ensemble of both, the invisible third party. The transfer space is characterized by a net transfer of substrates from source to sink, linear cost functions, saturating production functions and a consideration of the already achieved saturation. This results in four rational and selfish behaviours: giving a costing substrate (source), not giving an earning substrate (source) taking an earning substrate (sink) and not taking a costing substrate (sink). Whenever two not identically equipped parties meet with the potential to exchange substrates one party will become a source and the other a sink. The outcome depends on the relation between fix cost, variable cost, productivity and affinity. The selfishly transferred substrate will optimize productivity of one or both sides and will lead under certain conditions to a productivity increase of the ensemble. This increase roots in the transfer of substrates from saturated to unsaturated production conditions. Brute force and educational conditioning take advantage of emotions to hide the real size of the cost to the exploited party. In case the transfer of substrates leads to increased productivity parts of the productivity might be reinvested to keep the exploited party. The lasting relationship is called wise exploitation. Wise exploitation may last for one or many generations depending on the use of brute force, education or breeding. To maintain a stable system the benefit must always exceed the cost. The transfer space views group (ensemble) selection as egoism based exploitation from catalytic networks to societies and interprets the decision process under external influence in a single economic entity. The Nash equilibrium is avoided through breeding or brute force or education. The energy input of the sun into the source powers source, sink and the ensemble of both. Biologic systems and economic systems are open. Equilibrium considerations derived from thermodynamic isolated systems are not useful.

Altruism is no longer needed as an explanation for behaviour generally regarded as unselfish like giving or not taking. Only genetic tradition is a fact in biology. Successful genetic tradition is based on better productivity of individuals and ensembles of individuals. The wrong concepts of altruism and cooperation hinder progress in parts of Biology and Economy. Altruism is the Phlogiston of Biology.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: source; sink; ensemble; group selection; selfishness; altruism; exploitation; wise exploitation; brute force; fear; education; emotions; hope; hate; fix cost; variable cost; productivity; game theory; cooperation; prisoners´ dilemma; benefit; cost; transfer space; symbiosis; saturation function; predator; prey; stability; self sustaining; evolutionary stable; food chain; law of conservation of mass and energy; arms race; master; servant; Southampton strategy; coalition game; superadditivity; subadditivity; steady state equilibrium; open system
• Subjects: J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J1 - Demographic Economics > J10 - General; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C70 - General; Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q2 - Renewable Resources and Conservation

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