Popov, Sergey V. (2011): In pursuit for impeccable veracity. Forthcoming in: Economics Letters
Preview |
PDF
MPRA_paper_34414.pdf Download (111kB) | Preview |
Abstract
I study the institution of avoiding to hire one’s school own PhD graduates for assistant professorships. I argue that this institution is necessary to create better incentives for researchers to incorporate new information in studies, facilitating the convergence to asymptotic learning of the studied fundamentals.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
---|---|
Original Title: | In pursuit for impeccable veracity |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | academic inbreeding; moral hazard; knowledge; information dissemination |
Subjects: | L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D83 - Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection A - General Economics and Teaching > A1 - General Economics > A11 - Role of Economics ; Role of Economists ; Market for Economists |
Item ID: | 34414 |
Depositing User: | Sergey Popov |
Date Deposited: | 31 Oct 2011 23:52 |
Last Modified: | 28 Sep 2019 04:52 |
References: | Hugo Horta, Francisco M. Veloso, and Rócio Grediaga. Navel gazing: academic inbreeding and scientific productivity. Management Science, 56:414–429, March 2010. Boyan Jovanovic and Yaw Nyarko. Learning by doing and the choice of technology. Econometrica, 64(6):1299–1310, 1996. |
URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/34414 |