Halkos, George (2011): Cyclical and constant strategies in renewable resources extraction.
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This paper is concerned with the classic topic of intertemporal resource economics: the optimal harvesting of renewable natural resources over time by one and several resource owners with conflicting interests. The traditional management model, dating back to Plourde (1970), is extended towards a two–state model in which harvesting equipment is treated as a stock variable. As a consequence of this extension, an equilibrium dynamics with bifurcations and limit cycles occur. Next we discuss conflicts as a game with two types of players involved: the traditional fishermen armed with the basic equipment and the heavy equipment users. Both players have a common depletion function, thought as harvesting, which is dependent both on personal effort and on intensity of equipment’s usage.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Cyclical and constant strategies in renewable resources extraction|
|Keywords:||Renewable resources; exploitation of natural resources; differential games|
|Subjects:||C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C6 - Mathematical Methods ; Programming Models ; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling > C61 - Optimization Techniques ; Programming Models ; Dynamic Analysis
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C6 - Mathematical Methods ; Programming Models ; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling > C62 - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q3 - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation > Q30 - General
|Depositing User:||G.E. Halkos|
|Date Deposited:||11. Nov 2011 19:14|
|Last Modified:||21. Oct 2015 14:46|
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