Cassette, Aurélie and Farvaque, Etienne and Héricourt, Jérôme (2011): Two-round elections, one-round determinants? Evidence from the French municipal elections.
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Abstract
Using a new database of French municipalities that covers 821 towns and 2 elections (2001 and 2008), we examine how the budget structure, degree of electoral competition and the economic context affect the share of votes for the incumbent. We assess the specicities created by the two-round process under French electoral rule (a dual ballot under plurality rule). We show that in the first round of the electoral process, spending on equipment can influence the voter, and that electoral competition has a strong impact on the incumbent's score. In the second round, the incumbent's vote is affected more by national considerations and local budget variables have no effect. We show that the dynamics between the first and the second rounds are intense. The results suggest that the determinants of each round in a two-round electoral process are different.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Two-round elections, one-round determinants? Evidence from the French municipal elections |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Economic voting; Local elections; Plurality rule; Visible expenditures |
Subjects: | H - Public Economics > H7 - State and Local Government ; Intergovernmental Relations > H72 - State and Local Budget and Expenditures D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior H - Public Economics > H7 - State and Local Government ; Intergovernmental Relations > H76 - State and Local Government: Other Expenditure Categories |
Item ID: | 34675 |
Depositing User: | Pr. Etienne Farvaque |
Date Deposited: | 13 Nov 2011 15:20 |
Last Modified: | 27 Sep 2019 17:55 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/34675 |