Kukushkin, Nikolai S. (2011): Strategic complementarity and substitutability without transitive indifference.
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Abstract
We study what useful implications strategic complementarity or substitutability may have when the indifference relation(s) need not be transitive. Two results are obtained about the existence of a monotone selection from the best response correspondence when both strategies and parameters form chains. Two more results are obtained about the existence of a Nash equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities where strategy sets are chains, but monotone selections from the best response correspondences need not exist.
Item Type:  MPRA Paper 

Original Title:  Strategic complementarity and substitutability without transitive indifference 
Language:  English 
Keywords:  strong acyclicity; interval order; single crossing; monotone selection; Nash equilibrium 
Subjects:  C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C6  Mathematical Methods ; Programming Models ; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling > C61  Optimization Techniques ; Programming Models ; Dynamic Analysis C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7  Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72  Noncooperative Games 
Item ID:  34866 
Depositing User:  Nikolai S. Kukushkin 
Date Deposited:  20. Nov 2011 11:50 
Last Modified:  25. Sep 2015 11:45 
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URI:  https://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/id/eprint/34866 
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Strategic complementarity and substitutability without transitive indifference. (deposited 16. Feb 2010 22:37)
 Strategic complementarity and substitutability without transitive indifference. (deposited 20. Nov 2011 11:50) [Currently Displayed]