Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter (2011): Election inversions, coalitions and proportional representation: Examples from Danish elections.
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Abstract
When collective choices are made in more than one round and with dif¬ferent groups of decision-makers, so-called election inversions may take place, where each group have different majority outcomes. We identify two ver¬sions of such compound majority paradoxes specifically, but not ex¬clu¬si¬ve¬ly, relevant for systems of proportional representation with governing coalitions: The “Threshold Paradox” and the “Federal Paradox”. The empirical relevance of the two paradoxes is illustrated with examples from three Danish elections (1971, 1990, 2011), where a majority of the voters voted for one bloc of parties but where a majority of the seats fell to another.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Election inversions, coalitions and proportional representation: Examples from Danish elections |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Social choice; voting paradoxes; electoral systems; election inversions |
Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior |
Item ID: | 35302 |
Depositing User: | Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard |
Date Deposited: | 13 Dec 2011 21:19 |
Last Modified: | 30 Sep 2019 17:14 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/35302 |