Ownership, Performance and Executive Turnover

Chi, Wei and Wang, Yijiang (2007): Ownership, Performance and Executive Turnover.

Abstract

To more thoroughly study the effect of ownership on management turnover, firms are classified by ownership simultaneously along two dimensions: types of owners and concentration of ownership. Under this new framework, a unique data set is used to study the sensitivity of management turnover to a company’s performance. The study confirms some of the results from previous studies. It also obtained interesting and important new results. It finds evidence that the sensitivity of management turnover to performance is curvilinear in ownership concentration, but in opposite directions under state and private ownership. It also provides evidence allowing us to rank firms in different categories of ownership by their sensitivity of management turnover to performance: Concentrated private ownership has the highest sensitivity, concentrated state ownership the lowest, and the two categories of dispersed ownership, one with a private investor and the other with the state as the largest shareholder, in between. Important policy implications of these findings are discussed.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: state ownership; ownership concentration; performance; executive turnover
• Subjects: M - Business Administration and Business Economics ; Marketing ; Accounting ; Personnel Economics > M5 - Personnel Economics > M51 - Firm Employment Decisions ; Promotions

References

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