Coordination et décentralisation des règles budgétaires dans une structure fédéraliste: Le cas des cantons suisses

Soguel, Nils (2005): Coordination et décentralisation des règles budgétaires dans une structure fédéraliste: Le cas des cantons suisses. Published in: Revue d'Economie Régionale & Urbaine No. Nr 1 (August 2006): pp. 27-48.

Abstract

Summary The coordination of fiscal policies between states or municipalities collides with their individual spending and taxing power. When independently adopted, budget rules can potentially endanger the overall need for macroeconomic stabilisation. Utilising the example of the Swiss cantons, the paper analyses the possibility to bring out a counter-cyclical policy when sublevel governments introduce compelling rules to balance or almost balance their budget. It is shown that cantons usually adopt a pro-cyclical behaviour. However this behaviour can be thwarted if the central government uses the vertical intergovernmental transfers as an instrument of its stabilisation policy.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Institution: Institut de hautes études en administration publique IDHEAP - Swiss graduate school in public administration
• English Title: Coordination and decentralisation of budget rules in a federalist structure: The case of Swiss cantons
• Language: French
• Keywords: Coordination; budget rules; subnational governments; procyclicality; fiscal federalism
• Subjects: H - Public Economics > H1 - Structure and Scope of Government > H11 - Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government