Markets as economizers of information: Field experimental examination of the “Hayek Hypothesis”

Al-Ubaydli, Omar and Boettke, Peter (2010): Markets as economizers of information: Field experimental examination of the “Hayek Hypothesis”.

Abstract

The work of Friedrich Von Hayek contains several testable predictions about the nature of market processes. Vernon Smith termed the most important one the ‘Hayek hypothesis’: the gains from trade can be realized in the presence of diffuse, decentralized information, and in the absence of price-taking behavior and centralized market direction. Vernon Smith tested this by surveying data on laboratory experimental markets and found strong support. We repeat this exercise using field experimental market data. Using field experiments allows us to test several other predictions. Generally speaking, we find support for Hayek’s theories.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: price dynamics; entrepreneurs; field experiment; market process
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C90 - General; D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D61 - Allocative Efficiency ; Cost-Benefit Analysis; D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D40 - General; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design; L - Industrial Organization > L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior > L26 - Entrepreneurship; D - Microeconomics > D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium > D51 - Exchange and Production Economies; B - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches > B5 - Current Heterodox Approaches > B53 - Austrian

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