Correa, Sofía and TorresMartínez, Juan Pablo (2012): Essential stability for large generalized games.
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Abstract
We address the essential stability of CournotNash equilibria for generalized games with a continuum of players, where only a finite number of them are atomic. Given any set of generalized games continuously parameterized by a complete metric space, we analyze the robustness of equilibria to perturbations on parameters.
Item Type:  MPRA Paper 

Original Title:  Essential stability for large generalized games 
Language:  English 
Keywords:  Essential equilibria; Essential sets and components; Generalized games 
Subjects:  C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7  Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72  Noncooperative Games C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C6  Mathematical Methods ; Programming Models ; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling > C62  Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium 
Item ID:  36625 
Depositing User:  Juan Pablo TorresMartínez 
Date Deposited:  13. Feb 2012 16:58 
Last Modified:  06. Oct 2015 14:41 
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URI:  https://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/id/eprint/36625 
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