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Essential equilibria of large games

Correa, Sofía and Torres-Martínez, Juan Pablo (2013): Essential equilibria of large games.

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We characterize essential stability of Cournot-Nash equilibria for generalized games with a continuum of players. As application, we rationalize the active participation of politically engaged individuals as the unique essential equilibrium in an electoral game with a continuum of Cournot-Nash equilibria.

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