Noel D., Johnson and William, Ruger and Jason, Sorens and Steven, Yamarik (2012): Corruption as a response to regulation.
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Previous research has found a negative effect of corruption on growth in the United States. However, some theory suggests corruption might have a positive impact in places with dysfunctional political institutions. This paper investigates whether the corruption-growth link is conditional on the extent of government involvement across U.S. states. Even though no state approaches the level of government intervention found in many developing countries, we still find evidence that corruption’s harmful effects on growth are smaller when regulation is greater.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Corruption as a response to regulation|
|Keywords:||Corruption, U.S. States, Growth, Regulation|
|Subjects:||O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O1 - Economic Development
D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
H - Public Economics > H7 - State and Local Government ; Intergovernmental Relations
K - Law and Economics > K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
|Depositing User:||Noel Johnson|
|Date Deposited:||24. Feb 2012 14:22|
|Last Modified:||13. Feb 2013 08:53|
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