Can issue linkage help mitigate externalities and enhance cooperation

Pham Do, Kim Hang and Dinar, Ariel and McKinney, Daene (2011): Can issue linkage help mitigate externalities and enhance cooperation. Published in:

Abstract

Managing transboundary river basins is never easy and usually involves conflicts. This paper introduces a special class of games with externalities and issue linkage to promote cooperation on transboundary water resources. The paper analyzes whether issue linkages can be used as a form of negotiations on sharing benefits and mitigating conflicts. It is shown that whenever opportunities for linkages exist, countries may indeed contribute towards cooperation. In particular, if the linked games are convex, the grand coalition is the only optimal level of social welfare

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: games with externalities, convexity, s-core, transboundary rivers, issue linkage, international water sharing agreement
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D62 - Externalities; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71 - Cooperative Games; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games

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