Breitmoser, Yves (2012): Modeling choice and estimating utility in simple experimental games.
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Abstract
Current experimental research seeks to estimate shape and parameterization of utility functions. The underlying experimental games tend to be "simple" in that best responses are salient and individual choices consistent, but the analyses arrive at diverging results. I analyze how precision of estimation and robustness of results depend on the choice models used in the analysis. Analyzing dictator and public goods games, I find that regression models overfit drastically when choices exhibit high precision (dictator games), that structural models with simple error structure (normal or extreme value) do not fit the curvature, and that random behavior and random taste models do not identify social motives robustly. The choice process is captured well through the random utility model for ordered alternatives ("ordered GEV", Small, 1987).
Item Type:  MPRA Paper 

Original Title:  Modeling choice and estimating utility in simple experimental games 
Language:  English 
Keywords:  choice models; utility function; estimation; cross validation; dictator game; public goods game 
Subjects:  C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C5  Econometric Modeling > C50  General D  Microeconomics > D6  Welfare Economics > D64  Altruism ; Philanthropy C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7  Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72  Noncooperative Games 
Item ID:  37537 
Depositing User:  Yves Breitmoser 
Date Deposited:  22 Mar 2012 12:48 
Last Modified:  20 Jun 2016 22:29 
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URI:  https://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/id/eprint/37537 
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Structural modeling of altruistic giving. (deposited 06 Aug 2010 10:05)
 Modeling choice and estimating utility in simple experimental games. (deposited 22 Mar 2012 12:48) [Currently Displayed]