Faias, Marta and Moreno, Emma and Wooders, Myrna (2009): A Strategic market game approach for the private provision of public goods.

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Abstract
Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) provides an elegant gametheoretic model of an economy with one private good and one public good. Strategies of players consist of voluntary contributions of the private good to public good production. Without relying on first order conditions, the authors demonstrate existence of Nash equilibrium and an extension of Warr's neutrality result  any redistribution of endowment that left the set of contributors unchanged would induce a new equilibrium with the same total public good provision. The assumption of oneprivate good greatly facilities the results. We provide analogues of the Bergstrom, Blume and Varian results in a model allowing multiple private and public goods. In addition, we relate the strategic market game equilibrium to the private provision of equilibrium of Villanaci and Zenginobuz (2005), which provides a counterpart to the Walrasian equilibrium for a public goods economy. Our techniques follow those of Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003), which itself grows out of the seminal work of Shapley and Shubik (1977). Our approach also incorporates, into the strategic market game literature, economies with production, not previously treated and, as a byproduct, establishes a new existence of privateprovision equilibrium.
Item Type:  MPRA Paper 

Original Title:  A Strategic market game approach for the private provision of public goods 
English Title:  A Strategic Market Game Approach for the Private Provision of Public Goods 
Language:  English 
Keywords:  Public goods, market games, equilibrium, Nash equilibrium, private provision, voluntary contributions 
Subjects:  D  Microeconomics > D0  General > D02  Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact H  Public Economics > H4  Publicly Provided Goods > H41  Public Goods D  Microeconomics > D0  General > D01  Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles 
Item ID:  37777 
Depositing User:  Myrna Wooders 
Date Deposited:  31 Mar 2012 22:32 
Last Modified:  18 Sep 2016 15:26 
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URI:  https://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/id/eprint/37777 