A Note on Optimal Law Enforcement under Asymmetric Information

Jellal, Mohamed and Garoupa, Nuno (2002): A Note on Optimal Law Enforcement under Asymmetric Information. Published in: European Journal of Law and Economics No. 14:5-13,2002

Abstract

We show that the probability of apprehension and punishment is usually reduced in a framework with asymmetric information, leading to more offenses being committed. A positive correlation between crime and asymmetry of information in the enforcement process is established. Some suggestions concerning the efficiency of private versus public enforcement are drawn.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: fine, probability of detection, asymmetry of information
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design; K - Law and Economics > K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior > K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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