Munich Personal RePEc Archive

A Note on Optimal Law Enforcement under Asymmetric Information

Jellal, Mohamed and Garoupa, Nuno (2002): A Note on Optimal Law Enforcement under Asymmetric Information. Published in: European Journal of Law and Economics No. 14:5-13,2002

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We show that the probability of apprehension and punishment is usually reduced in a framework with asymmetric information, leading to more offenses being committed. A positive correlation between crime and asymmetry of information in the enforcement process is established. Some suggestions concerning the efficiency of private versus public enforcement are drawn.

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