Jellal, Mohamed and Wolff, François Charles (2003): Leaving home as a self-selection device. Published in: ECONOMICA No. 70, 423-438
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We develop a model of intergeneratioal coresidence and transfers within the family in a setting of asymmetric information. Following an exchange motive altruistic parents receive services from their children, who may make them financial gifts in return. However, parents do not know the privacyc ost to children of home-sharing .Hence they make additional transfers in order to discipline their children and give them incentives to reveal their true privacy cost. We show that only children who stay at the parental home receive an informational rent, and that this rent is greaterf or recipients with a low privacy cost.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Leaving home as a self-selection device|
|Keywords:||Family Exchanges,Transfers, Information, Co-residence|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
D - Microeconomics > D1 - Household Behavior and Family Economics
|Depositing User:||Mohamed Jellal|
|Date Deposited:||03. May 2012 07:46|
|Last Modified:||16. Feb 2013 01:10|
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